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Freedom and security have been seen as opposed in political rhetoric and theory. 
I contend that this simplifies the concepts themselves, and their interrelationship, 
drawing in particular on Spinoza to argue that the purpose of engendering security 
is to create the conditions of civic liberty. Recent debates over security in the face of 
the ‘terrorist threat’, and about the alleged need to ‘balance’ it against liberty, should 
be reorientated to engage not with statistically marginal risks, but with engendering 
collective freedom.
Introduction: Unstable Equilibrium 
It is a staple of political rhetoric and much academic commentary that the value 
of security has to be reckoned against that of liberty. Very often this idea is put 
forward via talk of a need to “balance” security and liberty (Waldron 2003). The talk 
of “balance” is a metaphor, albeit a well-worn one. Its prevalence has grown with 
the heightened security concerns since the turn of the entury. A paper produced by 
the United Kingdom government in late 2005, as the incumbent European Union 
Presidency, in the sequel to the bomb attacks in London of July 7th 2005, used this 
very phrase.1 
In academic discussion, too, talk of “balance” seems hard to escape.2 In 
Australia when Canberra’s Security Legislation Review Committee carried out its 
quinquennial review in 2006 of the terrorism offences proscribed by the Criminal 
Code Act 1995, the committee stated that in its view its remit required that “an 
appropriate balance must be struck between, on the one hand, the need to protect 
the community from terrorist activity, and on the other hand, the maintenance of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms”.3 The document goes on to deploy the 
“balance” metaphor repeatedly.
1 “Liberty and Security: Striking the Right Balance.” Available at <ccessed 24.2.2012). 
2 Cf. e.g. Posner & Vermeule 2006. See also: Smith 2007; Michaelson 2006a, 2006b; and Taylor 
2003; de Hert 2005; Davis & Silver 2003; Posner 2001; for more sceptical views on the notion of 
balance, see Ashworth 1998; Waldron 2003; Neocleous 2007. 
3 Security Legislation Review Committee, 3. 
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Talk of “balance” is then well established in discussions of security. But the 
metaphor is odd in itself (Waldron 2003). To strike a balance between two things 
is to place them in equilibrium. If one thinks literally of a scales, it is balanced if 
whatever is in one scale weighs the same as whatever is in the other. If the scales 
are initially in equilibrium, and then more is put into one scale, an amount of equal 
weight has to be put into the other scale in order to restore equilibrium.4 But in 
discussions of public policy, say in relation to concerns over terrorism, the talk of 
“balance” generally accompanies the suggestion that a greater measure of security 
must be bought at the cost of a loss in liberty or – less often – the converse.5 If 
more security needs to be “balanced” with less liberty, then they must have been 
out of balance to start with. Sometimes, incoherently, the idea is advanced that one 
“balance” between security and liberty needs to be replaced with a different one, 
for example in response to a perceived rise in security threats (e.g. Rosenzweig 
2003).6 
The Liberty / Security Conflict
So it seems that the metaphor of balance is, to put it charitably, mixed. The idea the 
metaphor confusedly expresses is that governments and its agents have to negotiate 
a trade-off between liberty and security, such that (at least over significant parts 
of the curve) a gain in liberty necessarily incurs a loss in security, and conversely.7 
The underlying idea here, roughly, is that there is a function of liberty and security, 
such that for all (or a significant range of) values, f(l + s) = C; so that an increase 
in the value of security, relative to some baseline or reference value, must mean 
a diminution in that of liberty. The notion that there is a trade-off to be negotiated 
between liberty and security goes back some way. In his contributions as “Publius” 
to the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton argued that liberty and security must 
come into conflict. When they do, citizens will inevitably forgo liberty for the sake 
of security:
4 Of course, if security and liberty are incommensurable goods, there is no homogeneous 
measure in terms of which the relative weights of security and liberty can be gauged, and so talk of 
balancing is empty. See Raz 1986, ch. 13; also Newey 1998.
5 In a speech to the Security Commission of the Institute for Public Policy Research in June 
2008 the Prime Minister Gordon Brown endorsed the House of Commons Home Affairs Select 
Committee’s call “for both practical measures and principled commitments from the Government to 
ensure the balance of liberty and security is maintained”. Available at <www.labour.org.uk/gordon_
brown_security_liberty> (accessed 5.3.2012).
6 “Significant events like Sept. 11 alter the balance between liberty and security, but the pendulum 
always returns to center as the threat diminishes”. Available at <www.washingtontimes.com/
news/2003/may/26/20030526-104007-5926r/?page=all> (accessed 5.3.2012). 
7 Schematically the relation might be thought of as similar to the graph of the function y = 1/x. At 
values close to 45° to the origin, the marginal trade-off will be high, but not at the asymptotes.
Newey
5
Safety from external danger is the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the 
ardent love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The violent destruction of 
life and property incident to war, the continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of 
continual danger, will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for repose 
and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy their civil and political 
rights. To be more safe, they at length become willing to run the risk of being less free 
(Hamilton 2001: 191).
Thus Hamilton found himself raising the spectre of authoritarianism even as the 
Continental Congress was meeting to shape the U.S. Constitution. Of course, part 
of the point is to institutionalise checks on executive power so that the pressures 
towards repressiveness are held back. But Hamilton’s final sentence discloses a 
familiar problem with the very idea of a trade-off, or conflict, or balance, between 
liberty and security: in downgrading liberty for the sake of security, the executive 
jeopardises security itself. For example, granting the police additional powers to 
arrest and detain terrorism suspects without charge must diminish civil liberties, 
such as the liberty not to be held without charge, or restricting certain kinds of 
speech on the ground that it may incite others to perform acts of violence. Debate 
then follows about whether the extension of police powers really will serve to 
enhance security. It is accepted on both sides that this extension retrenches on 
the civil liberties of terrorism suspects. But this also raises the concern that such 
measures, far from enhancing security, in fact diminish it. 
The point is not that the measure may fail to achieve its objective, perhaps 
because extending detention times is not an effective way of screening for 
terrorists, or because it may prove counter-productive by radicalising those who 
would otherwise not become terrorists. If so, extended detention may fail to prevent 
future acts of terrorism, or even promote them. These are possible empirical 
consequences of the policy. However, this is only part of the point: the policy may 
be thought objectionable in itself on security grounds. The diminution of liberty 
could be seen, by the same token, as constituting a diminution in security. 
Why? Summarily put, because if liberty itself is a good, as proponents of the 
“balancing” metaphor usually accept, then it is something which people have reason 
to value and hence to pursue. But also, if liberty is a good, it is itself something in 
relation to which people can be secure or insecure, and which they can enjoy or fail 
to enjoy. It could be said that the talk of trade-offs between goods may in turn be 
seen as figurative or elliptical, and that it says only that, at least in certain situations 
such as that of emergency, the goods will come into conflict. There is in fact no 
single way in which two goods A and B can conflict. One reason for the ambiguity 
is that what is in view when people talk of conflicting goods may be the good-types 
A and B, or tokens of them. The grounds for the conflict may, further, be held to be 
necessary, or to result from some empirical fact. And the conflict itself may take a 
zero-sum form – so that having k more units of A means having k fewer of B, and 
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conversely – or the conflict may be some weaker form, so that (say) having more 
of A generally means, or is likely to mean, that one has less of B. One could say 
that A and B necessarily conflict if there is no empirical fact which, if altered, will 
dispel the conflict. 
The most obvious way in which A and B can conflict is if there is an empirical 
fact as a result of which getting a token of A means losing or forgoing one of B; 
or, more generally, that getting more of A means getting less of B. This is often 
said to be the case with security and liberty – as, notoriously, in Hobbes’ state of 
nature, where the unrestricted liberty of all leads to marked insecurity for each. 
Certainly the exercise of liberty by one person in a certain respect can bring about 
a reduction in security for others, as when a driver takes to the roads when drunk. 
Here the relevant empirical fact is something like this: excess alcohol consumption 
impairs the cognitive and motor skills needed to drive a vehicle competently. Even 
here, however, we are talking about primitive freedom in a state of anarchy (cf. 
Williams 2005), rather than liberties granted under law. It is only too obvious that 
primitive freedoms conflict not only with security, but with one another: notably in 
Hobbes the freedom each person has to defend his life (Hobbes 1996, ch. 14). 
The liberties, as distinct from primitive freedoms, have been designed precisely in 
order to fit with the supreme good of security, and to this extent are tailored to the 
avoidance of conflicts with it. In fact, talk of conflicts between security and liberty 
usually relate not to primitive freedom but liberty as an artefact of state power – one 
designed to limit the incursion of the state or other citizens on individuals’ scope for 
action. I return to this point below.
So empirical conflicts of this sort establish little about the general relation 
between goods. This becomes clearer when one considers conflicts between two 
tokens of the same good. Very familiarly, one person’s exercising his freedom to 
act in a certain way may be achieved only at the cost of another person’s freedom 
to act in a different (or, indeed, under some descriptions, the same) way. Thus an 
audience’s freedom to form judgments about the quality of advertised products will 
be diminished if advertisers are free to impart false or subliminal messages about 
those products. Indeed, one’s own freedom to act in one respect may conflict with 
one’s freedom to do so in another – the fundamental basis for contractual self-
restraint. All these remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to the value of security as well 
as other goods, such as equality or loyalty or attentiveness. Hence the mere fact 
of empirical conflict either does not establish that the goods in the abstract conflict, 
or else establishes that conflict is pervasive within value as well as between the 
specific values of liberty and security. 
What about the idea that they necessarily conflict? The main way in which it 
might seem that there is a necessary conflict between liberty and security is by 
setting against one person’s or group’s gain in security a loss in liberty for another; 
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or conversely, where no empirical change of fact seems sufficient to eliminate the 
conflict. This can be so only where the conflict concerns the same object in the 
same respect(s), so the liberty of an agent to j, as such, necessarily runs afoul of 
another’s security from being j-ed. So someone’s freedom to torture, say, seems 
to conflict necessarily with another’s security from being tortured. But it seems that 
this contrast could be framed in terms of freedom as well – freedom from being 
tortured. A fork then suggests itself: either the values are indeed so closely related 
that their opposition is necessary. Then they look like alternative presentations of 
a single value; or the conflict is, after all, merely contingent. In the torture example, 
my freedom to torture you can certainly be thought of as opposed by your security 
from being tortured; but the opposition here arises from opposed modalities, such 
as “it is permissible that” and “it is not permissible that” in relation to the description 
“you are tortured”. The necessary conflict lies in the opposition between these 
modes, not in value-labels that may serve as shorthand for them. 
Here the fundamental opposition, cast in terms of rights, is between a liberty-
right and an immunity-right. Liberty-rights create an area of opportunity for their 
bearers to act by failing to assign them countervailing obligations. Immunities place 
others under obligations by entrenching the opportunity enjoyed by the liberty-right 
holder. It is, to be sure, one thing not to be under an obligation (say) not to speak 
one’s mind, and another to enjoy a guarantee under the First Amendment that 
the opportunity to speak one’s mind will not be rescinded. The latter may seem to 
sound in the register of security more than does the former. But both can still be 
seen as justified by reference to the valuing of freedom. It is only because they can 
that it makes sense to think of the immunity as securing, in the name of freedom, 
the liberty-right to speak. Once the situation is understood in this way, it seems that 
we could think of the opposition as not between liberty and security, but between 
alternative construals of liberty: of how, in the name of freedom, freedoms should 
be constrained within the law. 
There is of course a very large literature devoted to analysing the value of 
liberty, which I cannot address here.8 In liberalism the classic “negative” account of 
it given by Berlin (Berlin 1969) has been extremely influential. Berlin’s formulation 
of the distinction is notoriously opaque. But it seems that in its final form, “negative” 
freedom connoted for him a normatively-defined protected zone of opportunity 
where individuals can pursue their purposes without hindrance by human agency. 
How should we view the relation between liberty, so understood, and security? 
The conflict between liberty and security might seem to embody that between 
Berlin’s positive and negative freedom, respectively. Certainly, the security 
from being tortured would seem to exemplify negative freedom. Thus negative 
8  See, e.g., Hayek 1960; Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty”, in Berlin 1969, and 2002; 
MacCallum 1967; Nozick 1974; Skinner 1998 and 2002; Dworkin 1997; Gray 1980; Raz 1986; 
Arneson 1985; Cohen 1995; Pettit 1997, 2001; Christman 2005.
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freedom secures a space within which individuals can act, and it then follows that 
guaranteeing such a space to all will involve imposing restraints – for example, 
those of the “harm” principle, or some ideal of autonomy – on the freedom of each. 
This seems to involve, precisely, a securing of the individual from certain kinds of 
action. If so, then either the “negative” conception is not, after all, a conception of 
freedom, or else it needs to be shown why maintaining such a space cannot be 
regarded as a security concern. 
Security initiatives often aim to enhance the security of one group, such as 
airline passengers, while it is acknowledged that the liberty of those suspected of 
terrorism offences is diminished. Here it may not be out of place to talk of trading off 
a gain in security for the first group against a reduction in liberty for the second. But 
this does not show that there is some general incompatibility between security and 
liberty. Take the debate in the UK over the inclusion of innocent persons’ DNA on the 
national database maintained for the purpose of detecting and convicting criminals. 
DNA samples have been collected from crime scenes and from persons held in 
police custody. The number of profiles held on the database has grown rapidly 
since 2000.9 Its security use – to identify recidivists and other repeat offenders and 
match evidence at new crime scenes with a list of those known to have committed 
similar crimes previously – is obvious, and explains the UK government’s heavy 
investment in the supporting technology and infrastructure.10 Meanwhile, civil 
libertarians have opposed the profiling of all persons, subsequently charged or not, 
whose DNA is found by the police at crime scenes; DNA from persons arrested but 
not convicted also remains on the database.11 
Suppose that holding the DNA profiles of unconvicted persons amounts, in itself 
or at least potentially, to a reduction of their negative liberty.12 It could be said that 
unconvicted persons on the database will be more likely to figure as suspects in 
future crimes, and thus open to the array of police powers which can be deployed in 
gathering evidence and in interviewing suspects. It was also argued that retaining 
the DNA of those convicted of minor offences like begging was indefensible and 
9  At 31 March 2009, there were “an estimated 4,859,934 individuals whose DNA profile was held 
on the database” according to the National DNA Database Annual Report 2007-09, p. 5; available 
at <www.npia.police.uk/en/docs/NDNAD07-09-LR.pdf> (accessed 5.3.2012).
10  According to the monitoring organisation Genewatch UK, by 2005, the UK government had 
invested some £241m in the development of the national DNA database. See The Police National 
DNA Database: balancing crime detection, human rights and privacy, p. 11; available at <www.
genewatch.org/uploads/f03c6d66a9b354535738483c1c3d49e4/NationalDNADatabase.pdf> 
(accessed: 5.3.2012). 
11  The profiling of innocent persons occurs in England and Wales, but not in Scotland, where the 
DNA of acquitted persons without an existing criminal record is destroyed.
12  The European Court of Human Rights ruled in the case of S and Marper v the United Kingdom 
that retaining the DNA of innocent persons on the database infringed their human rights: Application 
Nos 30562/04 and 30566/04, Grand Chamber judgment 4 December 2008, paragraph 110, available 
at <www.bailii.org/eu/cases/ECHR/2008/1581.html> (accessed 5.3.2012).
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that it was unjustifiable that the time-span for deleting innocent persons’ DNA is 
greater if the sample is drawn from the scene of a terrorist crime rather than that of 
less serious offences.13 
So it could be argued, whatever the security benefits, that the DNA database 
policy infringes on individual liberties. However, as regards each of the points raised 
above, a similar claim could be made about individuals’ security. The database 
could be said to reduce the security of those on it, because their presence on it 
enlisted them among the suspects for future offence(s) in relation to which their 
DNA profile had been entered on the database. They would also be more likely to 
suffer a wrongful conviction – just because one can only be wrongly convicted if one 
is first tried, and database inclusion made the latter, necessary condition for that 
more likely.14 That is, these persons suffer reduced security against miscarriages 
of justice. 
Security as Freedom as Security
This is not to argue for or against the database either in principle or with regard to 
the specific policies adopted towards it by the UK government. It is only to suggest 
that the language of “liberty” can often be translated into that of “security”. This 
is not surprising, given that liberty itself is a valuable thing, which one can hold 
more or less securely.15 To have security requires that there be a reference object, 
something which is secured. Elsewhere I have called this reference object the 
valuables, as a shorthand for whatever is secured (Newey 2012). The things that 
are secured are taken to be goods: that is, they are thought of as having value. It 
does not follow that the reference objects of security must be really valuable. The 
claim is only that something must have value ascribed to it if one is to be able to 
have or enjoy security with regard to it. Suppose that something had no value at 
all, such as dust. If dust has no real or ascribed value, then one cannot be said to 
have security in relation to it. 
Conversely, if something is believed to be a good, it is something in relation to 
which one can believe that one has security, or lack it. A good is something such 
that there is reason to value and hence to pursue it. If there is reason to value 
the thing, then ceteris paribus the valuer can rank different worlds, according to 
13  Liberty’s response to the Home Office’s Consultation, §30.
14  This is not to say that a person whose DNA was on the database when tried would be more 
likely to be convicted than another person on trial who was not. The base rate for comparison 
purposes is with the population generally, not other defendants.
15  Cf. Article 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, “Right to Liberty and Security: 1. 
Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person [sic]”. The article sets out citizens’ rights 
to be safeguarded against arbitrary arrest and imprisonment, that is, liberties which convention 
signatories undertake to secure for their citizens.
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whether or not it exists in those worlds – exists, that is, in a form which realises 
value.16 If something’s having value gives reason to pursue it, then there is reason 
to pursue those states of the world which contain the thing, rather than lacking it. 
But suppose we confine our attention just to those worlds where the thing exists in 
a value-realising form. Then, by the same token, one has reason to rank – that is, to 
value more highly – those worlds where the thing is held over those where it is not.
On some views, however, security might be thought simply to comprise a set 
menu of valuables, which might fail to include liberty. However, even if liberty is 
not a valuable, it still makes sense to talk of particular liberties as being held, or 
enjoyed, more or less securely, including some of those which contribute towards 
the non-interference notion of liberty held by classical liberals (Berlin 1969; Mill 
1978). For example, suppose one takes the non-interference view of liberty again, 
and confines its scope to bodily integrity. Infringements upon one’s liberty – that 
is, violations of one’s bodily integrity – may clearly be more or less gross, but at all 
events will be experienced as an incursion upon something valuable. 
Clearly, not all physical interventions by another person will constitute an 
infringement of liberty: for instance, surgery or dental treatment. The reason why 
such interventions fail to count as infringing liberty is that unlike mugging, say, or 
the infliction of grievous bodily harm, they are willed by the person who undergoes 
them. As such these interventions are not perceived by the person as depleting 
value – on the contrary. Of course, it is possible to ask whether that perception is 
correct: whether their being willed rests on a false ascription of value.17 For example, 
willed bodily transformations, such as piercings or tattoos, might be thought to fall 
into this category. But then suppose that these do indeed deplete value, rather than 
enhancing it. Then the person is acting freely, or she is not. If not – for example 
because in order to be free, a person must pursue what is really valuable, rather 
than what she mistakenly regards as valuable – then clearly, by hypothesis, no 
issue of freedom arises. But if on the other hand she is free in seeking bodily 
transformations because this has value for her, then it must be possible to be free 
despite pursuing something which in fact has no value. But then the person must, 
even so, value her freedom to pursue this. And indeed historically this has been 
an important line of thinking about freedom: that one can have reason to value it, 
in respect not only of oneself but also of others, even if its exercise foreseeably 
leads to people’s making worthless choices on occasion – in other words, choosing 
things which have no value. 
In sum, either freedom has value imparted to it by the value of the objects of 
choice; or else it has value in its own right. In the latter case, there is reason to 
16  This qualification is meant to cover cases where the thing still exists, but no longer has value. 
17  That is, he mistakenly thinks the thing has value when it really has none, or mistakenly ascribes 
value to it when it actually has disvalue. 
Newey
11
value and hence to pursue freedom for its own sake. Freedom may have value in 
its own right, or have value derived from the things with respect to which one is 
free. In the case of things that have no value, any value freedom has must be non-
derivative. But even if its value is derivative, freedom does have value. So, either 
way, freedom can be treated as a valuable – as something which has value either 
in its own right, or from the objects of choice. In this it mirrors security itself. 
It may be argued, however that there can be valueless freedom. Suppose that 
someone is faced with a choice between two objects, one of which has significant 
value while the other wholly lacks it. For instance, imagine that someone is facing 
the choice between a life of hedonistic bacchanalia and one of religious devotion. In 
this case, someone could say that since one of the options is wholly devoid of value, 
the choice between them cannot have any value either, in which case, having the 
freedom to choose must lack value. But this is mistaken. As in theodicies such as 
Plantinga’s, there can be value in having (or exercising) the choice, even though the 
consequence of doing so in some cases is that people choose valueless options. 
It is, however, less easy to think that someone could have security in relation to 
options that objectively lack value. I come back to this in a moment.
Hence we reach the conclusion that something has value if and only if it is 
possible to enjoy security in relation to it. So, in particular, if freedom has value, it is 
something in relation to which one can have or enjoy security. Or, to put it the other 
way round, if one can have or enjoy security in relation to it, then freedom must 
be a good. So a policy which assumes arbitrary powers of arrest, imprisonment, 
and so on, and there by infringes on basic liberties – in other words, the “state of 
exception” of Schmittian theory (Schmitt 2005) – will thereby curtail individuals’ 
security as well. This is not to deny, of course, that there may well be other goods 
which will be secured by this action, but the operative contrast can as well be 
framed as being between liberty and liberty, or security and security, as between 
security and liberty. 
Security / Liberty: an Asymmetry
So far I have argued that, contrary to the trade-off picture, threats to security can 
be seen as equally posing threats to liberty. I have illustrated this point with Berlin’s 
concept of negative liberty, but the same goes, say, for the “republican” idea of 
freedom as non-domination (e.g. Skinner 1997; Pettit 1997; Laborde 2008). Indeed, 
it goes also for Berlin’s “positive” conception, viewed as “self-mastery”, since this 
will be jeopard ised by certain kinds of security threat: for example, those which 
menace the faculties or capacities on which self-mastery depends. This includes 
threats to cognitive, psychological and physical integrity, as well as to resources 
and opport unities. 
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All this might be thought to prove too much, and to impale the argument on one 
prong of the fork identified earlier – that security and liberty turn out to be disguised 
versions of one and the same value. And then, it could be said, the fact of conflict 
is dispelled, contrary to the widespread intuition that security and liberty can and 
do often conflict. Surely there is something in the idea that security can and does 
often conflict with liberty?
However, short of endorsing out-and-out axiological nominalism – in which every 
instantiation of a value is regarded as a distinct value – it is implausible to say that a 
value cannot be in conflict with itself (Newey 1998). As already argued, liberty may 
conflict with liberty, or security with security. So the effect of construing liberty and 
security as alternate presentations of a single value need not be to dispel conflict 
and thereby affront intuition. The claim that they are one and the same value may 
itself seem counter-intuitive. But I am not in fact going to argue that security and 
liberty are a single value in disguise. I have argued for the translatability of liberty 
claims into talk about security, but have not made the converse case. So in some 
situations where a person has or enjoys security, it may be inappropriate to talk 
about their having or enjoying liberty. For example, in a well-run jail the prisoners 
may enjoy security, say from assault by other prisoners, but not liberty (and so, 
trivially, would not enjoy security with respect to liberty itself). It is hard to believe, 
however, that the prisoners have liberty merely by dint of having security. 
Like security, liberty requires certain goods or valuables in respect of which it 
is enjoyed. In the case of liberty, these goods will often (on some views, always) 
comprise opportunities for action, whereas with security, they comprise fundamental 
goods. This might suggest that liberty deals in opportunities, and security in goods, 
but this contrast is overdrawn. Opportunities for free action usually rely on access 
to goods, such as resources, for their exercise – a point well made by critics of 
purely legalistic conceptions of liberty (e.g. Sterba in Sterba & Narveson 2010). 
Meanwhile, the value of goods that are secured, such as bodily capacities, depends 
on their creating opportunities for action (Sen 2009). In each case, too, enjoying 
security or liberty relies on extending certain guarantees, though there is also a 
“brute fact” view that does not heed the belief-states of the free or secure person.
The philosophical alternatives seem to run in parallel. If the goods or options 
really lack value, then securing them, or having the liberty between them lack value 
too. Otherwise, security and liberty regarding the goods or options may have value 
despite this, for example because the goods or options are regarded as having 
value. Perhaps the mere fact of imputing value to the objects of choice, or to the 
supposed valuables, is enough to endow the correlative notions of security or 
liberty with value. Then the concepts move in step again. 
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It seems, then, that to have liberty with regard to valuable options is just to 
be secure with regard to them. What about the relation between enjoying liberty 
and enjoying security? It might be suggested that what it means to enjoy liberty 
as a good is not the same as what it means to enjoy security. We can then ask 
whether in each case the conditions for the enjoyment of the good are the same. 
One question concerns the relation between enjoying and good and being aware 
that one has it. Does the enjoyment of liberty as a good require the awareness 
that one has liberty? If not, it may be said, one can enjoy liberty without a reflexive 
awareness that the grounds which constitute liberty hold. A young child may have 
the liberty to choose between two sweets. In choosing between them, however, 
it need not follow that the child is conscious of the fact that she has the liberty to 
choose between them. She may successively be conscious of each sweet without 
being conscious that she is at liberty to choose between them. 
This claim however seems hard to defend. She has the liberty to choose the 
chocolate, and she has the liberty to choose the lemon drop. But if, as imagined 
above, she is not aware of having both options, even if they are presented as 
exclusive of one another, it seems she does not have the awareness needed 
to constitute the liberty to choose between them. Rather each is presented 
successively as something that she can choose to have. The situation is in fact 
not so unusual. Suppose I am at liberty to go to supermarket A, which sells Blazzo 
washing powder, and supermarket B, which sells Bloppo. If I go to A and buy 
Blazzo, it does not follow that I have chosen between it and Bloppo. It follows 
only that I have chosen Blazzo. Conversely, compare the choice that I may face 
between two different professions. If I have the liberty to choose between a career 
as a milkman and as a painter, I must be conscious of being able to choose to 
become a milkman, and of being able to choose to become a painter; and if so, I 
must be conscious of being able to choose between the two. So in order to have 
the liberty to choose, one must be aware of having the liberty to choose. 
To enjoy a good is to experience the benefit of having it. But if one is unaware 
that one has liberty, it is hard to see how one could experience the benefit of having 
it. A lack of knowledge of the alternatives between which one has a choice – that 
is, lack of knowledge of what the available alternatives are – seems to remove the 
value of liberty for the person who has it. So for example a prisoner in a locked cell 
clearly lacks the liberty to leave. But if, without the prisoner’s knowledge, a warder 
unlocks the cell door, it is not clear that he now enjoys the liberty to choose whether 
to stay in the cell or leave it. Such possibilities are important in those accounts of 
liberty which see it as requiring emancipation from “false consciousness” – a state 
of mind where options that are notionally open have been foreclosed, because 
subjects have been programmed to overlook or otherwise dismiss them. The 
fragmented awareness case suggests that liberty to choose does not always require 
the consciousness of having a choice. But, in general, it seems that enjoying liberty 
Social Cohesion, Securitization and Counter-terrorism
14
to choose between options demands the awareness of having the liberty to choose 
between them. As the prisoner case shows, the liberty to choose something (and 
a fortiori to choose between it and something else) also requires awareness that 
one can choose it. 
What about enjoying goods? As already noted, to enjoy a good is to experience 
the benefit of having it (Newey 2012). This seems to highlight a difference between 
security and liberty. The brute fact of being liberty is not enough to guarantee the 
ignorant prisoner’s enjoyment of it. By contrast, there seems to be an obvious 
sense in which someone who does not know she has security with regard to 
a certain good, such as health, nonetheless still enjoys security with regard to 
it. Note that we did not deny that one can have liberty without being aware of it 
(and, perhaps less obviously, that one can be successively aware that each of the 
options that comprise liberty is available without being aware of having liberty to 
choose between them). On the face of it, one can likewise be secure without being 
aware of this fact. This is the position of someone who is falsely insecure with 
regard to some valuable, such as a hypochondriac’s false insecurity with respect 
to the good of health. It seems possible, moreover, that one can also enjoy security 
without being aware of the fact. If, unbeknownst to me, my home is secured in a 
high-crime area via the installation of various security devices including cameras, 
police surveillance, and so on, it seems clear that I experience the benefits of 
having security. The benefit – not being burgled, for instance – is provided by these 
devices, notwithstanding the fact that I am unaware of having them. The secure 
person must thereby enjoy security. 
Against this it may be said that cases of false insecurity such as that of the 
hypochondriac are precisely ones where the individual does not enjoy security, 
despite having it. But “enjoy” here means simply to experience the benefit of having 
a good, not necessarily to be aware of having it. The hypochondriac, by hypothesis, 
is not aware of having security with regard to the valuable of health – indeed, she 
does not believe that she has that valuable. Nonetheless, she can still be thought 
of as having the valuable of health. Because enjoying a good is experiencing the 
benefit of having it, she can be said to enjoy (good) health: she experiences the 
benefits of mobility, not being debilitated, and so forth. Against this, the objector 
may insist that the hypochondriac is, at least, not enjoying security with regard to 
her health. This objection trades on the idea that enjoying security regarding a good 
must add something extra to simply having the good. By hypothesis, again, she has 
security regarding health – that is why hypochondria exemplifies false insecurity. To 
experience the benefit of security as regards a good is just to experience the good 
stably, and this stability is not undermined by the hypochondriac’s false beliefs 
about her health. As Aristotle says, the good is “something proper to its possessor 
and difficult to take from him” (Aristotle 1926, 1095b25). 
Newey
15
By contrast, since he does not experience the benefit of having it, the ignorant 
prisoner will not enjoy liberty. So it follows, in the case of security, but not that 
of liberty, that anyone who has it must enjoy it. Hence the brute-fact aspect of 
enjoying security seems not to apply to liberty. One might call the enjoyment of 
liberty intrinsically reflective. This helps to explain another difference between 
liberty and security. It is possible that liberty to choose has value in its own right 
even when the objects of choice lack value. The fact of having the choice may be 
regarded as valuable in itself (Raz 1986, ch. 14). But one could not say that security 
would have value in its own right if the “valuables” lacked value. This difference can 
be explained by the relation between enjoying a good and being aware of having it. 
If security is not an intrinsically reflective good, since one can have it without being 
aware  of having it, then whatever value security has cannot consist necessarily in 
having this awareness. On the other hand, since one needs to be aware of having 
liberty in order to enjoy it, then its enjoyment is denied to the ignorant prisoner. 
Similarly, I may be at liberty to choose one thing, or to choose another, but not be 
at liberty to choose between them, being unaware of having the choice. I do not 
enjoy the liberty to choose between the things. 
Liberty v. Security: Saving Appearances
I will now suggest that these differences may help to explain the persistent belief 
that there is not merely a difference, but a constitutive incompatibility, between 
liberty and security. If the notion that a trade-off, etc., has to be negotiated between 
security and liberty is so common, why has this misconception become so 
widespread? According to one explanation, liberal democracies are in the business 
of legitimation, as Weber pointed out (Weber 1948: e.g. 294–95). Legitimation 
co-opts key normative concepts – notably, in liberal democracies, that of liberty 
– in order to remove executive action from the realm of brute facticity to that of 
justification. As such it presents might as subject to the constraining pressure of 
right. The very notion of legitimation points beyond rightless might (Williams 2005: 
ch. 1). But, of course, one way of legitimating the very fact of relying on rightless 
might is to argue that the usual grounds of legitimation have to be suspended in the 
name of a higher necessity. Talk of security offers a convenient rhetorical stand-
by when politicians want to concert acquiescence with state actions which may 
otherwise be unjustifiable (Neocleous 2007, 2008; cf. Waldron 2003). So, it may be 
said, democratic politicians’ thraldom to legitimation in general, coupled with the 
need on occasion to set aside the key legitimating value of liberty, leads them to 
reach for the language of security. 
The trouble with this analysis is that it seems to end up by obscuring the 
explanation behind the explanandum itself. If there is a puzzle about why “liberty” 
is so often mistakenly opposed to “security” in political rhetoric, the puzzle is hardly 
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resolved by noting that the pressures of raison d’état mean that politicians need an 
alternative legitimating idiom to the libertarian one; for in that case, the perception 
that liberties need to be sacrificed to security may not be mistaken, after all. On this 
view, the basis for the rhetorical opposition is that liberty and security conflict not 
just rhetorically, but in fact. Some would-be debunking accounts of the rhetoric of 
security seem to end up, unwittingly, making a claim of this kind. 
Security is sometimes said to be a non-excludable or non-rival good, meaning 
respectively that there is some group relative to which if some members of the 
group get the good, all do; and that one person’s getting more of it need not mean 
that any others get less (cf. Waldron 2006: 320f). This might be thought a contrast 
with liberty, since one can certainly exclude people from liberty (for example, 
by imprisoning them), and liberties can be rival (your liberty to eat your cheese 
sandwich excludes mine to eat it). But this contrast is again overdrawn. Security 
can be excludable. Often some people are exposed to higher levels of risk than 
others. The claim is a false generalisation from the fact that certain types of security 
goods, such as defence forces, may be non-excludable. Some liberties are non-
excludable, such as the liberty to breathe clean air, or free speech rights. Again, 
sometimes security is a rival good, as in Kant’s example of shipwreck ed sailors 
fighting over a piece of driftwood (Kant 1991: 81–82; Wood 1993: 91). 
But it does not follow that all attempts to explain the opposition must fail. For 
example, the constructivist (Buzan et al. 1998; cf. Baine 2006; Hough 2008; Buzan 
2008) analysis which represents “security” as being “socially constructed” can treat 
security as a catch-all to be called upon whenever policy demands that liberty be 
set aside (Loader & Walker 2007). So here “security” names whatever is invoked as 
a trump card against liberty. It provides an explanation of why it is widely believed 
that security and liberty clash – that political rhetoric treats them as incompatible, 
since when security is invoked to legitimate some policy, it is in order to set liberty 
aside. 
However, this explanation voids security of content. Security has content – 
which is far from saying that specific judgments, say about risk, which are made in 
supporting some liberty-trumping security measure, are correct. I have argued that 
unlike liberty, security is a good that one can enjoy non-reflectively, that is, one can 
experience the benefit of having security without being aware that one has it. The 
valuable options between which one chooses in enjoying liberty are possibilities of 
action or “capabilities” (Sen 1993, 1999, 2009). The valuables on which security’s 
value depends may be possibilities as well, but need not be. More generally, the 
mode in which a person engages with the external objects differs as between 
security and liberty. Someone who enjoys the good of liberty is, so to speak, in a 
state of suspension between valuable possibilities: to this extent, enjoying liberty 
necessarily involves the experience of one’s own agency. On the other hand, one is 
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secure with respect to certain valuables insofar as they are invulnerable to losses 
inflicted by the agency of others (Newey 2012). 
The awareness needed to enjoy liberty but not security, then, licenses the 
political argument that the liberties of which subjects are aware are jeoparised 
by the security which they take for granted. It is the very fact that security is less 
visible, in this respect, than liberty that leaves room for politicians to argue that 
“complacency” or lack of “vigilance” means that the security which is necessary to 
the continuance of political society, including liberty itself, has been neglected. Of 
course, the idea that security is necessary for liberty stands opposed to the claim, 
also often made when securitisation rhetoric is deployed, that security necessarily 
opposes liberty. I have already criticised that claim. The contrasting idea here is 
that unlike security, liberty is missed when it is removed, because as an intrinsically 
reflective good it is enjoyed through being aware of it. 
The DNA database example, however, suggests that this needs qualification. 
Surely people may be deprived of liberties without knowing it? Perhaps unbeknownst 
to me my DNA was retrieved from a crime scene and now is on the database. 
Since its retrieval occurred without my know ledge, it has no direct experiential 
effect on me. However, this is precisely a case where the security of my liberty 
is under threat. It is clear why Hamilton and other American revolutionaries like 
Benjamin Franklin saw threats to liberty as necessarily threatening security, so 
that security-based arguments for retrenching on liberty must be self-defeating. It 
may be objected that if so, liberty cannot be intrinsically reflective, since it can be 
removed or reduced without one’s knowledge. This is right: the difference between 
liberty and security only arises when liberty is exercised, rather than when it is 
viewed as an opportunity-set (for this distinction, see Taylor 1979; cf. Nelson 2005). 
So, insofar as the idea that liberty and security conflict has a conceptual basis, it 
lies in the intrinsically reflective exercise notion of liberty. An opportunity-set can 
be seen as a valuable, and thus as something in respect of which one can have or 
lack security, irrespective of whether one is aware of having the opportunities. But 
without that awareness one cannot exercise the specific liberties that constitute 
the opportunities, nor can one choose between them. This means in turn that one 
cannot enjoy liberty in these forms. 
None of this negates other explanations of the conflict between liberty and security, 
such as power-holders’ interest in using securitising rhetoric to override or short-
circuit democracy (e.g. Honig 2010). Nor does the explanation just given entail that 
the conflict idea is justified after all. Even an exercise concept of liberty can be 
expressed in the language of security, in that the former requires opportunities. The 
idea that theirs must be the exercise conception of liberty has perhaps deterred 
republican theorists from embracing the value of security as wholeheartedly as 
they might (e.g. Skinner 1997; Pettit 1997; Laborde 2008). On any plausible view, 
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the collective freedom to act both threatens the freedom of some, such as fellow 
citizens (freedom conflicts with freedom); and requires security for its exercise, 
such as from external threats to the collectivity (freedom presupposes security). 
Understanding is helped neither by accepting securitisation rhetoric at face value 
nor, while seeking to subvert that rhetoric, to keep its foundation intact – the 
opposition of security and freedom. 
Conclusion: Spinoza
I began by noting how freedom and security have been seen as opposed in political 
rhetoric and theory. But there has long been a contrasting tendency in political 
thinking about the relation of security to liberty. Spinoza suggests as much early in 
the Tractatus Politicus, where he argues that “liberty of the spirit, or courage, is a 
private virtue; but security is the virtue of the commonwealth” (Spinoza 1958: 264).18 
This seems to demarcate spheres of security and liberty.19 But in the Tractatus 
Theologico-Politicus, Spinoza expresses a different view. There he argues that the 
object of political society is not security, but liberty: 
from the explanation of the foundation of the commonwealth which was given earlier, it 
very clearly follows that its final purpose is not that of domination, nor is it to keep men 
cowed through fear and to subject them to the rule of another, but on the contrary to 
liberate each and all of them from fear so that each one may enjoy security insofar as 
he is able to do so, that is, so that he can best retain his own natural right of living and 
acting, without injury either to himself or to other people. The commonwealth’s purpose 
is not, I say, to change men from rational beings into brute beasts or robots, but on 
the contrary allow them to develop in safety the faculties of their minds and bodies, so 
that they may make free use of their reason and may avoid the conflict and the unjust 
mutual abuse that result from enmity, anger or deception. Therefore, the purpose of the 
commonwealth is, in fact, liberty (Spinoza 1958: 228-30).20
Spinoza upholds here a merging of security and liberty as ends or purposes of 
civil association. The commonwealth comes into existence in order to free people 
from fear so that they can enjoy security. However, as Spinoza goes on to explain, 
this end (while presumably good in itself) serves the ulterior purpose of creating 
the conditions in which people can develop their mental and physical faculties 
and thereby “make free use of their reason” – which Spinoza identifies, for human 
beings, with liberty. It is unsurprising that Spinoza should see political liberty and 
security as having this close relationship. In Part III of the Ethics he defines liberty 
18  Spinoza, Tractatus Politicus, §1.6. For commentary on this passage see James 2008.
19  Balibar 1998 argues that the incomplete Tractatus Politicus marked a shift in Spinoza’s thought 
towards a belief in security as the political summum bonum. Compare V ii of the Tractatus. See e.g. 
116. For a contrasting view, see Feuer 1987, e.g. 193. 
20  Ch. 20, §6; my translation.
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or freedom as the conatus or striving by which a being strives to preserve itself 
in accordance with the dictates of its own nature. Its overriding drive towards 
self-preservation – which one could see as the valuable good sine qua non – is 
identified with a being’s freedom. Hence for Spinoza it would be mistaken to think 
of freedom as something which is traded away in exchange for self-preservation. 
Instead, freedom consists in the conatus by which all creatures strive to preserve 
their own nature.21
Even in the case of Hobbes, often cited as a thinker who gives security absolute 
priority over liberty,22 matters are not so straightforward. In Hobbes’s view the 
decision with which people are faced in the state of nature does not reduce simply 
to abandoning liberty in favour of security. Instead, in realising the rational necessity 
of obedience to a sovereign, they recognise that that form of freedom which consists 
in the right of each person to everything necessary for self-preservation needs to 
be given up for the condition of civil liberty. There, as Hobbes says in Leviathan ch. 
21, each citizen’s freedom depends on “the silence of the laws”.23 The apparently 
limitless freedoms embodied in the natural rights of the state of nature, whose 
rationale is self-preservation, are of little value without security, whereas liberties in 
the civil state, though circumscribed by the law, are underwritten by the sovereign 
power.24 It is not that the imagined agreement to institute political authority involves 
a trading of liberty for security; but that, by the fact of agreeing, people create the 
security needed for their liberties to be effective.25
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